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Abstract  
 
7KLVDUWLFOHH[DPLQHVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIFLYLOLDQSURWHFWLRQQRUPVRQ&KLQD¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKH
crisis in Libya. It argues that Responsibility to Protect²an emerging norm commonly associated 
with the Libyan case²GLGQRWSOD\DPDMRUUROHLQ&KLQD¶VDEVWHQWLRQRQ5HVROXWLRQ
authorizing international intervention in Libya. For China, Responsibility to Protect is merely a 
concept and could not serve as the basis for intervention. Instead, Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, as a normative foundation for civilian protection endorsed by China, offers a more 
appropriate lens for understandinJ &KLQD¶V YRWH 3URWHFWLRQ RI &LYLOLDQV KRZHYHU GRHV QRW
DFFRPPRGDWH&KLQD¶VXQSUHFHGHQWHGHYDFXDWLRQRI&KLQHVHQDWLRQDOVIURP/LE\D7KLVRSHUDWLRQ
SURFHHGHGIURPDWKLUGORJLFRI3URWHFWLRQRI1DWLRQDOV$EURDGZKLFKSRVHVGLOHPPDVIRU&KLQD¶V
strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference and brings to bear domestic 
interests and notions of protection. 
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Introduction 
 
&KLQD¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHFULVLV in Libya, including its vote of abstention on the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council (SC) Resolution 1973 (2011) authorising international intervention in Libya 
and evacuation of &KLQD¶VQDWLRQDOVFDXJKWXSLQWKHFULVLV, raises two questions. How did civilian 
SURWHFWLRQQRUPVLQIOXHQFH&KLQD¶VDFWLRQVLQLibya and how can these actions be reconciled with 
&KLQD¶VWUDGLWLRQDOSRVLWLRQRQQRQ-intervention? 
 
This article argues that Responsibility to Protect (R2P)²an emerging norm that calls international 
actors to bear responsibility for protecting civilians from mass atrocity crimes and that is commonly 
associated with the intervention in Libya²did not SOD\DPDMRUUROHLQ&KLQD¶Vvote on Resolution 
1973 (2011). For China, R2P is a concept, rather than a norm or a principle of international 
relations, and could not serve as a framework for intervention.  
 
Instead, &KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQProtection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (POC) as a well-established 
international framework PDNHVLWDPRUHDSSURSULDWHOHQVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ&KLQD¶VYRWH. The long 
history on the UN agenda and the legal standing that POC has received over years of 
discussion and debate have made POC an important norm and a guideline for civilian protection 
action for China. It situates &KLQD¶Vacceptance of the need for protection action in the exceptional 
circumstances of the Libyan crisis within the broader normative context.  
 
However, POC did QRWDFFRPPRGDWH&KLQD¶VDFWLRQVRQWKHJURXQG²what Chinese media framed 
as the µGreat Evacuation¶ of Chinese nationals from Libya. These actions proceeded from a third 
logic of Protection of Nationals Abroad (PNA)²a grey area in international relations used by states 
WRLQWHUYHQHLQRWKHUVWDWHV¶WHUULWRU\WRUHVFXHWKHLUQDWLRQDOVLQWKHHYHQWRIa crisis. Undertaken 
before the adoption of Resolution 1973 (2011), with participation of ChinD¶V military, and a host 
state consent complicated by ongoing violence, this PNA mission in Libya DQG&KLQD¶V vote on the 
intervention sit uneasily with &KLQD¶V insistence on sovereignty and non-interference and point to 
the importance of domestic interests and notions of protection for &KLQD¶Vactions abroad. 
 
The analysis proceeds in three parts. The first part briefly defines and traces the evolution of POC, 
R2P, and PNA²the norms of intervention to protect civilians addressed in this article.1 The second 
part looks at the case of China and the protection of civilians in Libya. I conclude by drawing the 
implications of &KLQD¶VDFWLRQVLQ Libya for our understanding of the evolving norms of protection 
and the tensions involved in protecting civilians in crisis situations. 
 
Norms of Intervention to Protect Civilians  
 
This section defines and examines the evolution of three norms of intervention to protect civilians, 
namely POC, R2P, and PNA, rarely included in the discussion of civilian protection.2 It outlines 
                                                 
1
 While these norms encompass civilian protection options other than intervention, I focus on their intervention aspect. 
2
 I adopt the definition of norms as µstandard[s] of appropriate behavior¶ and apply it broadly to POC, R2P, and PNA, 
in the sense of a common concern with civilian protection (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891; on the shared normative 
core of protection, see Breakey et al (2012)). I follow :LHQHU¶V2014, 3) µprinciple of contestedness¶ in viewing these 
norms as contested µin principle¶ to a varying degree after their emergence, institutionalization, and implementation. 
While POC µHQMR\VDOHVVFRQWHVWHGUHSXWDWLRQ¶, R2P and PNA are controversial and, in principle, may not achieve the 
taken-for-JUDQWHGTXDOLW\LPSOLHGLQ)LQQHPRUHDQG6LNNLQN¶VOLIH-cycle model (Breakey and Francis 2011, 39).  
2 
 
the historical context, norm emergence (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), institutionalization (Risse 
et al 1999), and implementation (Betts and Orchard 2014) of these norms in the context of the UN 
and highlights the tensions among and between these norms and the principles of sovereignty and 
non-interfereQFHLQVWDWHV¶LQWHUQDODIIDLUV.3  
 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  
 
Protection of civilians has a long history of debate rooted in an increasing recognition during the 
twentieth century of the burdens that civilians bear in times of crisis, be it nature-related or man-
made. This article focuses on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, which since the 1990s has 
been a separate thematic issue on the UN agenda.4 
 
81ERGLHVGHILQH32&DVµPHDVXUHV«WRSURWHFWWKHVDIHW\GLJQLW\DQGLQWHJULW\RIDOOKXPDQ
beings in times of war which are rooted in obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), 
refugee law, and huPDQULJKWVODZ¶*&53, 1). The basis of POC is the idea that a sovereign 
state may not in certain circumstances be regarded as the sole provider of security to its people and 
that the international community may be involved in such provision in situations of armed conflict. 
Boutros-Ghali articulated this idea in An Agenda for Peace in the early 1990s. µ>$@UPHGFRQIOLFWV¶, 
he saidµbring fear and horror to humanity, requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, 
contain and bring them to an HQG¶5  
 
With failures of the UN efforts in the crises in Rwanda and the Balkans, among others, this urgent 
need became even more apparent in the late 1990s (SCR 2008). As a result, for the first time POC 
was addressed as a separate issue in the Secretary-General¶V report on the situation in Africa in 
1998.6 The report stressed the extent of civilian suffering in armed conflict and referred to civilian 
protection in such situations DVDµKXPDQLWDULDQLPSHUDWLYH¶7 It laid out the normative foundations 
of civilian protection as not simpl\µDPDWWHURIGHIHQGLQJVWDWHV«>EXWRI@defending humanity 
LWVHOI¶ and drew a legal basis of civilian protection in armed conflict from the principles of 
international law.8 This report marked the emergence of the POC norm within the UN. 
 
The norm saw institutionalization at the UN as Secretary-General reports, presidential statements, 
and SC resolutions began to address it on a regular basis and called upon the norm in case-specific 
mandates. In his reports, Secretary-General offered recommendations to the SC regarding POC.9 
Key SC resolutions responding to these recommendations include Resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 
(2000), 1674 (2006), and 1738 (2006). 
 
                                                 
3
 Principles have µa status of shared understanding and« sufficient consensus WR«IXQFWLRQDVDIRXndation for action¶ 
(Bellamy 2009, 2). Sovereignty and non-interference are primary examples in the contemporary international system.  
4
 Breakey (2012, 40-41) differentiates between combatant, peacekeeping, Security Council, and humanitarian POC. I 
do not address the latter and focus on the normative foundation for civilian protection provided by POC, rather than its 
practice within UN peacekeeping.  
5
 A/47/277±S/24111 of 17 June 1992, para. 13. 
6
 S/1998/318 of 13 April 1998. See also SCR (2011). 
7
 S/1998/318 of 13 April 1998, para. 49. 
8
 S/1998/318 of 13 April 1998, para. 3. 
9
 See S/1999/957 of 8 September 1999; S/2001/331 of 20 March 2001; S/2002/1300 of 26 November 2002; 
S/2004/431 of 28 May 2004; S/2005/740 of 28 November 2005; S/2007/643 of 28 October 2007.  
3 
 
Resolution 1296 (2000) marked a significant development on POC. It drew an explicit connection 
between breaches of IHL and human rights in armed conflict and international peace and security, 
the SC¶VPDLQ task. µ[D]eliberate targeting of civilian populations¶ LWstated, µmay constitute a 
threat to intHUQDWLRQDO SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\¶10 This framing of the issue allows the SC to use 
measures beyond peaceful means to ensure civilian protection as part of its task of maintaining 
international peace and security.  
 
POC was implemented for the first time in Resolution 1270 (1999) on Sierra Leone that authorised 
the UN peacekeeping operation µWRDIIRUGSURWHFWLRQWRFLYLOLDQVXQGHULPPLQHQt threat of physical 
YLROHQFH¶11 This mandate offered the operational definition of POC (Holt and Taylor 2009, 57). 
The norm was then repeatedly used in case-specific mandates in the context of UN peacekeeping 
operations.12 However, questions remain regarding its practice, especially the distribution of roles 
between host states and the international community and specific measures to be taken.13  
 
Responsibility to Protect  
 
Responsibility to Protect was a subsequent normative development in the area of protection. The 
insights gained over the 1990s that not only the state and conflict parties, but also the international 
community are responsible for the provision of security to civilian populations in armed conflict, 
and that the SC can invoke measures beyond peaceful means to provide such protection, constitute 
important stepping stones for this development.  
 
The emergence of R2P dates back to the foundation in 2000 of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Research and consultations leading up to the ICISS 
report underscored the tension between sovereignty and responsibility embedded in the notion of 
civilian protection (Annan 1999). R2P, as articulated in the report, stressed that sovereignty carries 
with it a responsibility of the state to protect its people. When it fails to do so, its sovereignty may 
be breached. Notably, the report related international responsibility to the SC¶V WDVN WRXSKROG
international peace and security, but detached R2P from humanitarian intervention by highlighting 
the primary use of non-coercive means by the international community and the use of force only 
as a measure of last resort. It added DQHPSKDVLVRQSUHYHQWDWLYHDFWLRQµ3UHYHQWLRQLVWKHVLQJOH
most imSRUWDQWGLPHQVLRQRI>53@¶, it said (ICISS 2001, xi). 
 
An early statement on R2P, the report included a broad range of causes of harm to populations, for 
which states could bear repercussions, leading to serious doubts among states such as China and 
Russia about desirability of such a norm. The scope of the emerging norm was, thus, highly 
contested in the process toward institutionalization (Welsh 2013).  
 
In 2005, when the norm was put to a test at the UN World Summit and accepted by consensus in 
the Outcome Document, its scope was QDUURZHG WR µUHVSRQVLELOLW\ WRSURWHFW SRSXODWLRQV IURP
                                                 
10
 S/RES/1296 of 19 April 2000, para. 5. See also S/PRST/1999/6 of 12 February 1999. 
11
 S/RES/1270 of 22 October 1999, para. 14. 
12
 See, for example, S/RES/1856 of 22 December 2008, on the Republic of the Congo. 
13
 For a discussion, see, for example, Holt and Berkman (2006) and Bellamy and Williams (2011).  
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genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.¶14 R2P was subsequently 
reaffirmed in Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009), among others. In the 2009 Secretary-
General¶VUeport it was defined as comprised of three pillars²the protection responsibility of the 
state, the international community¶V commitment to assist the state, and the international 
responsibility to respond if the state fails to protect its people.15 As Welsh (2013, 368) argues, 
µR2P is best conceived as a responsibility to consider a real or imminent crisis involving mass 
atrocity crimes¶ (emphasis in original). 
 
This definition clarifies the relationship between POC and R2P. The two norms developed in 
relation to one another and share the normative foundations (Sampford 2012, 105). They build on 
the idea that protection of civilians in armed conflict and populations at risk of mass atrocities is 
related to the task of the SC to maintain international peace and security and, hence, specify a role 
for the Council in mandating protective action. Neither calls for intervention as the single available 
action. The emphasis of R2P on the primary responsibility of the state and on prevention, and the 
scope of the norm distinguish it from POC. Whereas POC implies reaction to breaches of IHL and 
human rights in situations of armed conflict broadly, R2P calls for prevention of particular mass 
atrocity crimes and clarifies the notion of responsibility for both the state and the international 
community in ensuring that such atrocities are adequately addressed.16 
 
In contrast to POC, institutionalization of R2P over the last decade was not matched by a similar 
level of implementation. R2P was mentioned in Resolution 1706 (2006) on Darfur, but omitted 
from subsequent resolutions on this and other cases (Rothwell and Nasu 2011). It was not until the 
crisis in Libya that R2P was specifically referred to in Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), 
arguably making the case of Libya the first instance of implementation of the norm (Bellamy 
2010). The difficulties in putting R2P into action, evident in its scarce implementation, the lack of 
a mechanism for implementation that all UN Member States could agree to, once again highlight 
the tension between the principles of sovereignty and non-interfeUHQFHLQVWDWHV¶LQWHUQDODIIDLUV
and the norm of responsibility for civilian protection.17 
 
Protection of Nationals Abroad  
 
The tension between sovereignty and responsibility is most pronounced in the consideration of the 
idea and practice of PNA. While PNA has been hotly debated within the broader rubric of the use 
of force in international affairs, it has rarely made it into the discussion of civilian protection. As 
PNA has long been reflected upon and practiced by states, this omission is consequential for our 
understanding of what civilian protection means and involves in various circumstances. Drawing 
on the earlier legal studies on the topic, Wingfield (1999-2000, 441) defines PNA as:  
 
the use or threat of imminent use of armed force by a state to safeguard, and usually 
remove, its nationals from the territory or exclusive jurisdiction of another state, without 
                                                 
14
 A/RES/60/1 of 24 October 2005, para. 139. ,PSRUWDQWO\µparagraph 139 confirmed that international society may 
rightfully enforce the performance of >VWDWH¶V@ responsibilities and implied that such enforcement may be appropriately 
undertaken without sovereign consent¶*ODQYLOOH 
15
 A/63/677 of 12 January 2009. 
16
 For further discussion, see Breakey et al (2012) and Francis et al (2012). See also SCR (2008) and GCRP (2009). 
17
 This is particularly evident in the case of Syria. See, for example, Garwood-Gowers (2013). 
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the consent of that state or the authorization of the United Nations Security Council, where 
the lives of those nationals are in actual or imminent peril. 
 
7KHXVHRIIRUFHWRUHVFXHRQH¶VQDWLRQDOVDEURDGZDVJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHGSULRUWRWKHDGRSWLRQRI
the UN Charter (Brownlie 1963). Article 2(4) of the Charter, however, prohibits the use of force 
internationally, with the exceptions of action authorised by the SC to maintain or restore 
international peace and security (art. 42) and self-defence in an event of an armed attack (art. 51). 
7KH &KDUWHU GRHV QRW SURYLGH IRU IRUFLEOH LQWHUYHQWLRQ RQ EHKDOI RI D VWDWH¶V QDWLRQDOV DEURDG
Neither does customary international law.18  
 
Nonetheless, many states continue to undertake PNA actions (see, for example, Zedalis 1990; 
Quigley 1990; Chesterman 19995XVVLD¶V interventions in Georgia in 2008 and most recently in 
Ukraine in 2014 are vivid examples (Chatham 2011).  
 
The widespread use of PNA is often justified by the UHIHUHQFHWRWKHVWDWH¶Vinherent right to self-
defence even if absent an armed attack.19 In 2000, the Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, 
the closest issue to PNA at the UN, drew on this justification to incorporate PNA into the debates 
of the International Law Commission. Only a few states responded positively, recognising the need 
to discuss the use of PNA within an official forum. Most, however, met the suggestion with great 
criticism. As a result, the practice of PNA has continued without thorough international discussion. 
 
As Grimal and Melling (2011, 543) DUJXHµthere operates« DFRQWLQXXPRIWROHUDWLRQ¶regarding 
PNA, from the most abusive, when states use PNA to invade other states, as in the widely discussed 
case of the US invasion of Panama in 1989, to armed hostage rescue, such as the Israeli mission in 
Uganda in 1976, to the more tolerable non-combatant evacuation operations, when states withdraw 
their nationals from crisis situations, as in &KLQD¶V evacuation from Libya in 2011.  
 
It is the latter, evacuation operations that come closest to a standard of behaviorZLWKµYDULRXV
instances of states sending in troops to extract nationals and others from dangerous situations 
where a state was LQYROYHG LQ D FLYLO ZDU RU GRPHVWLF XQUHVW¶ *UD\   While these 
operations may often be tolerated in practice and deemed as appropriate in certain circumstances, 
they bear implications for the study of the relationship among the norms of intervention to protect 
civilians and between these norms and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. 
 
In contrast to PNA, the norms of POC and R2P are administered by the UN²an international body 
with rules and regulations, including SC authorisation and host state consent, set out in the Charter. 
PNA, on the other hand, is generally a unilateral practice, customarily bypassing international rules 
and regulations. Justified on self-defence or humanitarian grounds, PNA commonly proceeds in 
violation of sovereignty and non-LQWHUIHUHQFHLQVWDWHV¶LQWHUQDODIIDLUV 
 
Furthermore, PNA introduces an important distinction in the practice of protection between the 
different types of the civilians of concern. Whereas POC and R2P relate to all groups²civilians 
in armed conflict for the former and populations at risk of mass atrocities for the latter,²PNA 
                                                 
18
 An alternative argument suggests that although the UN Charter does not provide for PNA, it does not outlaw it 
either (see, for example, Greenwood 1986-1987). See also Arend and Beck (1993) and Green and Waters (2010).  
19 On justifications of PNA, see, for example, Ruys (2008). See also Eichensehr (2007-2008).  
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shifts the focus to a specific group of nationals facing or perceived to be facing a serious threat in 
a crisis situation in a foreign country. This defining element of PNA inevitably brings to bear the 
aspect of domestic politics to civilian protection, often overlooked in the analysis of this issue. 
Importantly, the logic employed by states with regard to salient domestic issues, such as its 
nationals at risk abroad, often conflicts with the international positions of states on such questions 
DVLQWHUYHQWLRQDQGWKHXVHRIIRUFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV&KLQD¶V µGreat Evacuation¶ in Libya 
is an example of this tension.  
 
China and the Protection of Civilians in Libya 
 
China has historically insisted on respecting sovereignty and non-interference20 in international 
relations and seeking authorisation DQGFRQVHQWWRLQWHUYHQHLQDQRWKHUVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\ (Liu and 
Zhang 2014). Despite &KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJFRQWULEXWLRQVWRinternational efforts to protect civilians 
through peacekeeping and humanitarian assistanceµstate sovereignty and non-[interference] are 
still the basic norms for China in dealing with international relations¶Liu 2012, 166).21 However, 
&KLQD¶V vote of abstention on Resolution 1973 (2011) authorising non-consensual military action 
in Libya and its actions with regard to Chinese nationals in Libya conflicted with these principles. 
Drawing on the case of China and Libya, this section discusses the application of R2P and POC to 
the Libyan crisis and brings the overlooked practice of PNA to the debate on civilian protection.22  
 
Conflict Background  
 
On 15 February 2011, following the arrest of a human rights activist, a massive wave of anti-
government protests began in Libya. Protesters were met with a harsh crackdown by the security 
IRUFHVRI&RORQHO0XDPPDU*DGGDILZKRKDGUXOHG/LE\DIRURYHUIRXUGHFDGHV*DGGDIL¶VIRUFHV
used aircraft to attack protesters. As protests spread across the country, Gaddafi called on his 
VXSSRUWHUVWRJRRXWDQGDWWDFNWKHµFRFNURDFKHV¶SURWHVWLQJDJDLQVWKLPDQGYRZed WRµFOHDQVH
/LE\DKRXVHE\KRXVH¶%%& 2011).23 
 
As events in Libya unfolded, regional organizations, including the Arab League and the African 
Union, began to express concern with the situation, strongly condemn the use of force against the 
protesters, and urge the Libyan authorities to immediately end violence and ensure the protection 
of civilians (Organization of the Islamic Conference, 20 February 2011; Council of the European 
Union, 21 February 2011; Arab League, 22 February 2011; African Union, 23 February 2011).24 
The UNSC was as a result seized by the issue. It welcomed statements of the regional organizations 
                                                 
20
 The SULQFLSOH µIRFXVHVRQ³interference´«EXW LQFHUWDLQFDVHVVHHPV WRDOVRFRYHU ³intervention´«RIWHQused 
interchangeably¶ in China (Duchâtel et al 2014, 1). 
21
 &KLQD¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR81SHDFHNHHSLQJKDVJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHGRYHUWKHSDVWGHFDGHVHYLGHQFHGE\WKHFKDQJHLQ its 
ranking from 44 in 2001 to 15 in 2010 (Liu 2012, 164). 
22
 The case study draws on a comprehensive review of official documents on &KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQ53DQG32&DQG on 
civilian protection in the case of Libya, including published materials of the UN and regional organizations engaged in 
Libya, and a V\VWHPDWLFPHGLDVHDUFKRQ&KLQD¶VUesponse to the crisis, including Western media and Chinese sources, 
particularly Xinhuanet and the 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\, in both English and Chinese. 
23
 )RUDIXOOFKURQRORJ\RIWKHHYHQWVVHH2¶%ULHQDQG6LQFODLU 
24
 See Organization of the Islamic Conference (2011); Council of the European Union, EN 6763/11 of 21 February 
2011; Arab League (2011); African Union, PSC/PR/COMM(CC LXI) of 23 February 2011. 
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DQGµFDOO>ed@RQWKH*RYHUQPHQWRI/LE\DWRPHHWLWVUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFWLWVSRSXODWLRQ¶and 
nationals of foreign states present in the country.25 
 
On 25 February, at the request of nearly 50 Member States of the UN, the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) convened the Special Session on Libya.26 The Session resulted in the resolution adopted 
by consensus, establishing an independent international committee of inquiry and recommending 
that the General Assembly suspend Libya from the HRC.27 Consequently, and for the first time in 
the history of the HRC, the GA decided to suspend a state¶VPHPEHUVKLSIURPWKH&RXQFLO.28 
 
On 26 February, following the SC Meeting on Peace and Security in Africa, where the Secretary-
General advised the international community to immediately adopt measures for civilian 
protection in Libya, the SC passed Resolution 1970 (2011).29 It stated that the attacks against 
FLYLOLDQVLQ/LE\DPD\DPRXQWWRFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\RQHRIWKHIRXUµ53FULPHV¶DQGWKDW
the Libyan authorities have the responsibility to protect civilians. It demanded the Libyan 
authorities to end violence, requested Member States to cooperate in evacuating foreign nationals, 
referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposed an arms embargo, travel 
ban, and assets freeze, while expressing a readiness to consider further action if necessary. 
 
Prompted by the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with the resolution, on 17 March, the 
SC adopted further measures. Resolution 1973 (2011) reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities to protect the Libyan population and expressed the determination of the SC to ensure 
the protection of civilians, including foreign nationals. The SC referred to the crisis as constituting 
a threat to international peace and security and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorised 
Member States to take all necessary measures to protect civilians. It established a ban on flights to 
help protect civilians and expanded the implementation of Resolution 1970 (2011). 
 
China and Resolution 1973 (2011) 
 
Given the references to R2P in Resolution 1973 (2011) and other statements of the UN, regional 
organizations, and international civil society, practitioners and academics in the area of civilian 
protection have argued that Libya constitutes an R2P case, one of the first cases in which the 
emerging norm passed the implementation test (Evans 2011; Claes 2011; Peral 2011; Rothwell 
and Nasu 2011). The Secretary-General called WKHUHVROXWLRQµDQKLVWRULFGHFLVLRQ¶that µDIILUPV«
WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR IXOILO LWV UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WRSURWHFWFLYLOLDQV IURP
violence perpetrated upon WKHPE\WKHLURZQ*RYHUQPHQW¶30 Ramesh Thakur argued that with the 
implementation in Libya, R2P came closer to becoming DQµDFWLRQDEOHQRUP¶ (Thakur 2011). 
 
Nevertheless, the standing of R2P in the case of Libya may be overstated. For China, in particular, 
R2P is merely a concept in need of clarification, rather than a norm.31 While China fiercely 
                                                 
25
 SC/10180 of 22 February 2011. 
26
 A/HRC/S-15/1 of 25 February 2011. 
27
 A/HRC/S-15/L.1 of 25 February 2011. 
28
 A/65/L.60 of 25 February 2011; A/RES/65/265 of 3 March 2011. 
29
 For the Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VDGGUHVVVHH639RI)HEUXDU\6HHDOVRUN News Centre (2011b). 
30
 SG/SM/13454 of 18 March 2011. 
31
 9LHZHGDVDFRQFHSW53LVµDSURSRVDO«UHTuiring further development, elaboration, or agreement before it can 
EHWXUQHGLQWRVKDUHGH[SHFWDWLRQVRIDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXU¶%HOODP\China referred to R2P as a concept in 
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opposed R2P as articulated at the ICISS in 2001, it endorsed a limited version of R2P at the World 
Summit in 2005 and in Resolution 1674 (2006) reaffirming R2P.32 Chinese officials thereafter 
KDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKH2XWFRPH'RFXPHQWµJDYHDQH[WHQVLYHDQGYHU\FDXWLRXVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRf 
>53@¶DQGWKDWµLWLVQRWDSSURSULDWHWRH[SDQGZLOIXOO\LQWHUSUHWRUHYHQDEXVHWKLVFRQFHSW¶33  
 
In a statement to the General Assembly on July 24, 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin summarised 
&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKH interpretation and implementation of R2P. He said that, first, the primary 
responsibility for protection lies with the government of a given state. Implementation of R2P by 
the international community can include assistance, but must adhere to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference at all times. Second, R2P applies to the crimes specified at the 
World Summit and should not be extended. Third, unilateral implementation of R2P must be 
avoided and relevant actions must be in line with the UN Charter, the views of the government 
concerned, and those of regional organizations. Fourth, when authorising action, the SC must 
consider R2P in the context of international peace and security. Lastly, as 53µUHPDLQVDFRQFHSW
and does not constitute a norm of international law«6WDWHVPXVWDYRLd using [it] as a diplomatic 
tooOWRH[HUWSUHVVXUHRQRWKHUV¶34 
 
This summary indicates that China accepts certain elements of R2P. Assuming the limitation of the 
R2P scope to the four crimes, two pillars²the protection responsibility of the state and the 
commitment of the international community to assist the state given its consent²are in accordance 
with the UN Charter and international humanitarian law (and practice at the UN prior to the 
emergence of R2P).35 These pillars are supported by China. 
 
The last pillar²the responsibility of the international community to act in timely and decisive 
manner if a state fails to protect its people²is more problematic. Such action includes peaceful 
means under Chapter VI and VIII and, if these fail, non-peaceful means under Chapter VII.36 It is 
the latter that China is most concerned with.37 Regardless of the cause, China does not accept any 
DFWLRQ XQOHVV µWKH ZLOO RI WKH *RYHUQPHQW FRQFHUQHG [is] respected and its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity presHUYHG¶38 &KLQD¶VSUHUHTXLVLWHVIRUDFWLRQinclude not only consent, but also 
SC authorisationµ>1@RDUELWUDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQVKRXOGEHLPSRVHGRQWKH*RYHUQPHQW concerned 
RYHU LWV REMHFWLRQ¶ and, in authorising action, the SC must act with regard to its key task of 
maintaining international peace and security.39 
 
As discussed above, the SC recognised, within POC framework, that breaches of IHL and human 
rights in armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the 
                                                 
multiple statements, for example, S/PV.5319 of 9 December 2005; S/PV.5476 of 28 June 2006; S/PV.5577 of 4 
December 2006; S/PV.5781 of 20 November 2007; S/PV.5898 of 27 May 2008. 
32
 For a detailed discussion, see Job and Shesterinina (2014). See also Teitt (2009), Foot (2011) and Tiewa (2012). 
33
 S/PV.5577 of 4 December 2006.  
34
 A/63/PV.98 of 24 July 2009. 
35
 See S/PV.5577 of 4 December 2006, p. 7µLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH&KDUWHUDQG>,+/@WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFW
civilians lies primarily with the Governments of the countries concerned.¶ 6HH DOVR 639RI  -XQH 2006; 
S/PV.5781 of 20 November 2007. 
36
 A/63/677 of 12 January 2009, paras. 49-66. 
37
 See, for example, A/63/PV.98 of 24 July 2009. 
38
 S/PV.5703 of 22 June 2007. See also S/PV.5476 of 28 June 2006; S/PV.5577 of 4 December 2006; S/PV.5781 of 
20 November 2007; S/PV.5898 of 27 May 2008. 
39
 S/PV.5703 of 22 June 2007. 
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SC has a foundation to act with regard to these crimes. For China, however, the problem lies in 
the ambiguity of R2P as to the specific means involved and its fear that R2P will turn into a one-
size-fits-all interventionary doctrineµ&RQIOLFWVLWXDWLRQVYDU\¶&KLQHVHRIILFLDOVVD\µWKHUHPXVW
be no one-size-fits-all approach to the protection of civilians« [We] still hold divergent views on 
[R2P], and the General Assembly should continue its discussion on this PDWWHU¶40 Until consensus 
RQLWVDSSOLFDWLRQLVUHDFKHGµ>W@KH6HFXULW\&RXQFLOVKRXOG« refrain from invoking the concept¶41 
 
The explanation China offered for its abstention, rather than veto, on Resolution 1973 (2011) is in 
line with this position.42 While the resolution stated WKDWµWKHZLGHVSUHDGDQGV\VWHPDWLFDWWDFNV« 
against the civilian population [in Libya] may amount to crimes against KXPDQLW\¶RQHRIWKHµ53 
FULPHV¶ DQG µ>U]eiterat[ed] the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan 
SRSXODWLRQ¶ Chinese officials did not refer to R2P in GLVFXVVLQJ &KLQD¶V YRWH or indicate that 
&KLQD¶VYLHZRIWKHUHVROXWLRQ was in light of R2P.43 As Liu (2012, 168) saysµ&KLQese attitude 
toward LibyD« accorded with its attitudes towards the RtoP concept.¶ The ambiguities China sees 
in the application of its third pillar prevented China from using R2P as a framework for 
intervention in Libya. Instead, Chinese officials appealed to extensive support of regional 
organizations for action and the particular situation prevailing in Libya at the time. 
 
µ&KLQDLVDOZD\VDJDLQVWWKHXVHRIIRUFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV¶, Chinese officials emphasised.44 
Interference in a sovereign state must accord with the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force, 
unless authorised by the SC to maintain or restore international peace and security or for self-
defence. As µLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶DQGµVHOI-GHIHQFH¶FDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGGLIIHUHQWO\DQG
misused, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference must in all cases be respected, and host 
state consent for interference of any form sought (see, for example, Jiang Yu in Xinhuanet 2011e). 
Even if justified as a threat to international peace and security, Resolution 1973 (2011) authorised 
µDOOQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV¶DQGWKHQR-fly zone without consent of the Libyan state. As a result, China 
µKD[d] serious difficulty ZLWKSDUWVRIWKHUHVROXWLRQ¶45  
 
However, µ&KLQDattache[d] great importance to the relevant position [of regional organizations] 
on the establishment of a no-IO\]RQHRYHU/LE\D¶ in particular the Arab League.46 The importance 
of regional organizations is a prominent theme for China.47 Chinese officials have long argued that 
                                                 
40
 S/PV.6531 of 10 May 2011. See also S/PV.5319 of 9 December 2005; S/PV.5573 of 28 November 2006; S/PV.5834 
of 12 February 2008; S/PV.6216 of 11 November 2009; S/PV.6427 of 22 November 2010. 
41
 S/PV.5703 of 22 June 2007. 
42
 A veto could be expected since the resolution authorisHGµDOOQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV¶WRSURWHFWFLYLOLDQVZKLFKimplied 
intervention, and established a non-consensual no-fly zone over Libya (S/RES/1973 of 17 March 2011, paras. 4-12). 
China blocked similar resolutions in the past (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2014, 115). 
43
 S/RES/1973 of 17 March 2011. This conclusion is based on a comprehensive survey of Chinese statements at the 
UN as well as international and local Chinese media on the issue, including the sources in English and Chinese. The 
reluctance to use R2P language was common in the Security Council. See, for example, S/PV.6498 of 17 March 2011.  
44
 S/PV.6498 of 17 March 2011. &KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHXVHRIIRUFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVLVURRWHGLQ&KLQD¶V
fears of interference by other states (Tiewa and Zhang 2014). A non-democracy with serious human rights issues, 
territorial problems in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and a potential for natural disasters, China has a strong foundation 
for ensuring that interventionary policies remain an exception rather than a rule 
45
 S/PV.6498 of 17 March 2011. 
46
 S/PV.6498 of 17 March 2011. 
47
 &KLQDKDVEHHQKLJKO\LQWHUHVWHGLQEHFRPLQJDNH\DFWRULQWKHUHJLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\$IULFD&KLQD¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQ
the inclusion of the views of relevant regional organizations into the UN processes may be explained by this objective.  
10 
 
the views of these organizations should be considered when making decisions at the UN level.48 
The call of the Arab League for the imposition of a no-fly zone prior to the adoption of Resolution 
1973 (2011), thus, greatly influenced &KLQD¶VDEVWHQWLRQ (Liu 2012, 168).49 The establishment of 
an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya by the African Union and other decisions of the 
organization with regard to the crisis as well played a role.50  
 
Furthermore, Chinese officials repeatedly cited µWKHH[WUHPHO\H[FHSWLRQDOVLWXDWLRQ¶LQ/LE\D and 
µWKHVSHFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHVLWXDWLRQ¶DVa key justification for the vote.51 As early 
as on 23 February, the UN Secretary-General said WKDWµ>W@KH nature and scale of the attacks on 
civilians [in Libya] are egregious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law¶
(UN News Centre 2011a). Key UN figures, including UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Navy Pillay, and regional organizations confirmed the gravity and urgency of the situation.52 Thus, 
µ[t]KHJUHDWHVWXUJHQF\¶for China, was µWRFHDVHWKHYLROHQFHWRHQGWKHEORRdshed and civilian 
FDVXDOWLHV¶53 As Garwood-Gowers (2015, 11) summarisesµ%HLMLQJ¶VGHFLVLRQ«ZDVVKDSHGE\
an unusual set of circumstances, including the presence of regional support for international 
military intervention [and] WKHXUJHQWQHHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDODFWLRQLQWKHIDFHRI*DGGDIL¶VH[Slicit 
threats against civilians.¶ 
 
The POC framework, as a normative foundation for international civilian protection, helps situate 
&KLQD¶VYRWHLQWKHEURDGHUQRUPDWLYHFRQWH[WChina views POC as a well-grounded international 
framework for action. As Ambassador Liu argues, µ7KHLVVXHRIWKHSURWHFWLRQRIFLYLOLDQVLQDUPHG
conflict is an old one. International humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949 and its two Additional Protocols of 1977, sets out adequate provisions in this regard.¶54 
Charged with maintaining international peace and security, the SCIRU&KLQDµ>X@QGRXEWHGO\«
VKRXOG IRFXV RQ« WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI FLYLOLDQV LQ DUPHG FRQIOLFW UDWKHU WKDQ DQ\WKLQJ HOVH¶55 
Through its resolutions, especially Resolution 1674 (2006), and presidential statements on POC, 
Ambassador Liu maintains, WKH6&HVWDEOLVKHGµ>D@OHJDOIUDPHZRUNRQWKHLVVXH«WKDWVHWVRXW
specific requirements with regard to the actions of the parties concerneG¶56 
 
$VDUHVXOWµ>W@KHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶DFFRUGLQJWR&KLQDµdeveloped a relatively complete 
V\VWHPRILQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOQRUPV¶RQ32&ZKLFKJLYHVLWDVWURQJbasis to guide international 
action on civilian protection.57 &KLQD¶VNH\FRQFHUQLQWKLVUHJDUGLVKRZWRHIIHFWLYHO\LPSOHPHQW
POC. As with R2P, Chinese officials strongly urge against a one-size-fits-all interventionary 
approach: µ>32&@ through the use of force should be authorized with extreme caution« [after] 
                                                 
48
 See, for example, S/PV.4980 of 28 May 2004; S/PV.5282 of 17 October 2005; S/PV. 5529 of 20 September 2006; 
S/PV.5649 of 28 March 2007; S/PV.5735 of 28 August 2007; S/PV.5868 of 16 April 2008; S/PV.6092 of 18 March 
2009; A/63/PV.98 of 24 July 2009; S/PV.6206 of 26 October 2009; S/PV.6257 of 13 January 2010. 
49
 League of Arab States, Res. No.: 7360 of 12 March 2011. 
50
 African Union, PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV) of 10 March 2011. 
51
 A/65/PV.76 of 1 March 2011; S/PV.6498 of 17 March 2011. See earlier reference to the special circumstances in 
SC/10187/Rev.1 of 26 February 2011; A/65/PV.76 of 1 March 2011.  
52
 Pillay 2011; Organization of the Islamic Conference, 20 February 2011; Council of the European Union, 21 
February 2011; Arab League, 22 February 2011; African Union, 23 February 2011. 
53
 SC/10187/Rev.1 of 26 February 2011. 
54
 S/PV. 5577 of 4 December 2006. 
55
 S/PV.6216 of 11 November 2009. See also S/PV.4312 of 23 April 2011; S/PV.5319 of 9 December 2005. 
56
 S/PV. 5577 of 4 December 2006; see also S/PV.5476 of 28 June 2006. 
57
 S/PV.6216 of 11 November 2009. 
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serious and careful discussion [by the SC« and with] strict provisions on the mandate.¶58 China 
has, thus, supported POC actions, especially when authorised with full consent of the host state.59  
 
$Vµ>W@KHRULJLQDOLQWHQWLRQRIUHVROXWLRQ« 1973 (2011) was to put an end to violence and to protect 
FLYLOLDQV¶, Chinese officials argued, &KLQD¶V vote was cast, in the normative terms, µWRVWDELOL]HWKH
situation in Libya as soon as possible and to halt acts of violence DJDLQVWFLYLOLDQV¶60 However, its 
implementation, according to the Chinese, exceeded the SC mandate, making it difficult for China 
to justify its vote in the aftermath of the crisis.61  
 
The Great Evacuation  
 
While China justified its abstention on Resolution 1973 (2011) by reference to the regional support 
for intervention and the exceptional circumstances in Libya, its explanation for protecting Chinese 
nationals residing in Libya brought domestic factors to the fore. China carried out its largest non-
combatant evacuation operation to date in Libya, for the first time actively involving the 3HRSOH¶V
Liberation Army (PLA) to protect Chinese nationals in a conflict zone (Duchâtel 2014, 48).62  
 
The evacuation began on 22 February, when President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao of China 
RUGHUHGµDOO-RXWHIIRUWV WRVHFXUHWKHOLIHDQGSURSHUW\RI&KLQHVHQDWLRQDOV LQ/LE\D¶ (3HRSOH¶V
Daily Online 2011a; CNTV 2011). On 23 February, the first of the two chartered Air China planes 
WRRNRIIWR7ULSROLIROORZHGLQWKHQH[WGD\VE\;X]KRX3/$¶VJXLGHG-missile frigate that carried 
anti-piracy duties off the coast of Somalia and was now set for Libya (Collins and Erickson 2011b; 
Duchâtel et al 2014, 49; Xinhuanet 2011a, 2011b). Other chartered planes, ships, including two 
Greek liners, and buses for overland routes to Egypt and Tunisia were as well employed.63  
 
2Q)HEUXDU\&KLQD¶VHYDFXDWLRQEHFDPHDµPXOWL-servLFHRSHUDWLRQ¶ZKHQWKH3/$$LU)RUFH
approved by the Central Military Commission, dispatched four Ilyushin-76 long-range military 
transport aircraft to Sabha, Libya, which entered the Libyan airspace (Collins and Erickson 2011a; 
Xinhuanet 2011c). By 3 March, the µ*UHDW(YDFXDWLRQ¶ as Chinese media called it, returned home 
35,860 citizens²the entire population of Chinese nationals residing in Libya (Xinhuanet 2011h; 
Xinhuanet 2011d; 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\2QOLQH 2011c). 
 
These PNA actions with participation of the Chinese military rested on intricate grounds regarding 
the two prerequisites that China calls for in international intervention (see discussion above). First, 
the SC had not yet passed its resolutions on Libya by the time when China launched its operation. 
Resolution 1970 (2011) was passed on 26 February, when ChinD¶V evacuation was well under way. 
While the operation could be justified as normatively appropriate in the Libyan case, China had not 
had the specific SC authorisation in the first stages of the evacuation.  
                                                 
58
 S/PV.6650 of 9 November 2011. Instead of reactionary force, China advocates conflict prevention and resolution, 
with an emphasis on preventative diplomacy and long-term economic development (S/PV.6531 of 10 May 2011). 
59
 &KLQD¶VYRWHLQIDYRURI5HVROXWLRQJLYHQ6XGDQ¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIDSHDFHNHHSLQJIRUFHLVH[HPSODU\  
60
 S/PV.6531 of 10 May 2011; S/PV.6498 of 17 March 2011. See also S/PV.6650 of 9 November 2011. 
61
 For China, the resolution turned into involvement in the civil war and regime change (S/PV.6531 of 10 May 2011). 
62
 Evacuation of Chinese nationals from conflict zones is not a new phenomenon for China. Recent examples include 
evacuations from Kyrgyzstan and Egypt in 2010 and 2011 respectively. For a list of evacuations in 2006-2014, see 
Duchâtel et al (2014, 46). The Libyan evacuation was different in its scope and use of the military. 
63
 See Duchâtel et al (2014, 50) for a full list of Chinese institutions involved in the operation. 
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Second, the HYDFXDWLRQGLGQRWIROORZ&KLQD¶VXVXDODSSURDFK RIµrely[ing] on a host government to 
protect Chinese QDWLRQDOVLQDWLPHRIFRQIOLFW¶ (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2014, 115). &KLQD¶V
relations with Gaddafi had been strained.64 More importantly, the Gaddafi regime was engaged in 
the escalating civil war and could not protect Chinese nationals in Libya. In this context, µWKHIXOO
consent of the Libyan authorities [was] simply [unfeasible] because there [wa]s either no one to ask 
RUQRRQHDEOHWRDQVZHUZLWKDXWKRULW\¶Parello-Plesner 2011, 2).  
 
China had to rely on technical consent to enter the Libyan territory and the neighbouring countries¶
approval of the operation. For example, a Chinese embassy staff member reported on 24 February 
that a permission for planes and ships participating in the evacuation to land and dock in Libya 
was requested (China Daily 2011). China, thus, µdid not issue a statement as to whether it had 
sought prior approval from the Libyan authorities¶, but declared that the Libyan authorities were 
not opposed (Duchâtel et al 2014, 49). Although the evacuation was µregarded by China as being 
in line with non-interference¶, the conditions of ongoing violence in Libya created challenges for 
ChLQDWRJDLQIXOOFRQVHQWRIWKHVWDWH¶VJRYHUQPHQW. 
 
Domestic interests and notions of protection appear to be central to &KLQD¶VXQSUHFHGHQWHGHIIRUWs. 
&KLQD¶VH[SDQGLQJHFRQRPLFSUHVHQFHDEURDGZLWK&KLQHVHQDWLRQDOVOLYLQJDQGZRUNLQJLQKLJKO\
unstable environments, such as Libya, invites China to bend the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference to protect Chinese nationals (Parello-Plesner and Duchâtel 2014). The significance of 
the issue is recognised to the extent that, after the Libyan operation, protection of Chinese nationals 
abroad EHFDPH&KLQD¶VµQHZIRUHLJQSROLF\SULRULW\¶'XFKkWHO et al 2014, 3). Domestic political 
pressure for such SURWHFWLRQZDVSDUDPRXQWLQWKHFDVHRI/LE\DZLWKµintense media attention and 
public focus on the crisis amplifying the pressure for Beijing to act¶(Zerba 2014, 1099). 
 
In their explanation of the evacuation for the domestic audience (most of the written material is in 
Chinese sources), Chinese commentators referred to the responsibility of the Chinese government 
to protect its citizens abroad as the foundation for the evacuation. Xinhua reporters emphasised that 
the evacuation effort demonstrated -LQWDR¶VµSHRSOH-first QDWXUHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶FDSWXUHGLQ the 
government motto RIµSXWWLQJSHRSOH ILUVWDQGUXQQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHSHRSOH¶ 
(Xinhuanet 2011e; Liberation Army Daily 2011a). &RPPHQWLQJRQWKHPLOLWDU\¶VLQYROYHPHQW Ji 
Mingkui, Major General and Professor at the National Defence University, said that mobilization 
of the PLA reflected WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWREHDULWVduty to protect Chinese citizens and 
even use the military to fulfil this duty (China Radio International Online 2011). 
 
For the Communist Party of China, the multi-service evacuation operation turned out to be a great 
success, as it was praised at home by the attendees of top annual meetings of the advisory body and 
the legislature and intellectuals (Xinhuanet 2011f).65 &KLQD¶VLQWHUQHWXVHUV µQHWL]HQV¶,²a segment 
of the SRSXODWLRQWKDWKDVEHFRPHRIFRQFHUQWR&KLQD¶VOHDGHUVhip ZLWKDSRWHQWLDOIRUDµMDVPLQH
                                                 
64
 For example, iQ*DGGDIL¶VVRQLQYLWHGWKH3UHVLGHQWRI7DLZDQa sensitive issue for China, to visit Libya. The 
same year, Gaddafi refused to participate in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and later, in 2009, Libyan official 
EODPHG&KLQDIRUµLQYDGLQJ¶WKHFRQWLQHQW<XQ 
65
 Zhang Lili (2011), Director/Professor at the Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy Research Centre, China Foreign 
Affairs University, characterises the evacuation as the largest and shortest, farthest away, using the greatest variety of 
transportation means, number of countries and regions involved, the very first military deployment, and the most 
organised diplomatic actions. On the scale of the evacuation, see also China Military Online, 1 March 2011. 
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UHYROXWLRQ¶ developing in the cyberspace²as well commended the evacuation (3HRSOH¶V'DLO\
Online 2011b; Liberation Army Daily 2011b; Zerba 2014).66  
 
Xinhua, the official news agency of the government of China, attributed the evacuation¶V 
success WR WKH WLPHO\ RUGHUV RI &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV its growing power, DQG µWKH DGYDQWDJH RI WKH
socialist system enabling the whole country to mobilize all of the necessary resources needed for 
DQDUGXRXVPLVVLRQ¶Xinhuanet 2011g; Xinhuanet 2011d). Referring to reports of Western media, 
Chinese media asserted that the world was amazed by China¶V strength (3HRSOH¶V'DLO\2QOLQH 
2011d).  
 
The notion of protection as the responsibility of the government for its people, H[SUHVVHGLQ&KLQD¶V
accounts of the evacuation, has µroots in Chinese traditions of statecraft and corresponding visions 
of world order¶(Yeophantong 2013, 332). As Krebs (2014, 19) findsµtraditional Confucian ideals 
DQGDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVWDWH¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFWLWVSHRSOH¶are tied to state legitimacy in 
Chinese thought and have carried their weight through time, shifting in the recent decades from a 
domestic focus to include protection of Chinese nationals internationally. The responsibility of the 
Chinese government to protect its nationals abroad is clearly reflected in &KLQD¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ.67 
 
This understanding of the protection of Chinese nationals abroad accords with &KLQD¶V treatment 
of R2P as primarily the responsibility of the government for protecting its own citizens.68 When a 
crisis occurs, Chinese officials argue that, be it natural or man-made, the host state is responsible 
for the safety of all civilians, including foreign nationals, and no intervention to protect them may 
take place without its consent.69 However, R2P does not incorporate the VWDWH¶V protection duty for 
its citizens outside of its territory²ZKDW7KDNXUFDOOVµWKHGXW\ to protect.¶ Neither does the 
well-established framework of POC.70  
 
R2P and POC entail the protection of all civilians at risk of violence and specify the responsibilities 
of the host states and the international community for such protection. No unilateral or voluntary 
action by third states, or states whose nationals may be caught up in a crisis, is provided for by the 
two norms. Third states should act in accordance with the decisions of the SC regarding a crisis.  
 
In turn, PNA isolates foreign nationals as a distinctive group and assigns additional responsibility 
for their protection to the state whose citizenship they bear. This responsibility is not provided for 
by the UN Charter or customary international law. PNA involves inWHUYHQWLRQLQDQRWKHUVWDWH¶V
territory even if no host state consent or SC authorisation have been provided and, thus, presents 
challenges to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.  
 
While the Chinese evacuation in Libya proceeded from a precarious consent and SC resolutions 
authorising action only after the operation began&KLQD¶VJURZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFHVXJJHVWV
                                                 
66 On the importance of Chinese cyberspace as an arena for nationalist activity and recognition by ChinD¶VOHDGHUVKLS
of the importance of netizens, see Hughes (2000); Erickson and Collins (2010); The Economist, 28 February 2011.  
67
 &RQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDDUWVHHDOVR$&1 of 7 March 2000.  
68
 A/63/PV.98 of 24 July 2009; see section on China and Resolution 1973 (2011).  
69
 See, for example, A/C.6/63/SR.23 of 3 November 2008. )RU &KLQD¶V YLHZV RQ GLSORPDWLF SURWHFWLRQ DQG WKH
prohibition on the use of force, see, for example, A/C.6/47/SR.2S of 2 November 1992; A/C.6/55/SR.19 of 30 October 
2000.  
70
 As noted above, UN officials attempted, but failed to incorporate PNA into POC discussions. 
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that under certain circumstances, when its domestic interests are at stake, China may be willing to 
forego its otherwise invariable insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in undertaking future 
PNA actions. As Chinese officials acknowledge, µ,WKDVDOZD\VEHHQ&KLQD¶VSROLF\WRQRWLQWHUIHUH
with the domestic affairs of other nations, yet when it comes to protecting the rights and interests 
RILWVRYHUVHDVQDWLRQDOVWKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWZLOOEHIXOO\PRELOL]HG¶Xinhuanet 2010).71 
 
Conclusion  
 
The analysis of &KLQD¶Vresponse to the 2011 crisis in Libya has implications for our understanding 
of the evolving norms of civilian protection and intervention in crisis situations. Drawing on this 
case, the article shows that, first, there exists a tension between the norms of intervention to protect 
civilians. In some cases, emerging norms, such as R2P, may be applied and cited in the international 
decisions taken to protect civilians. However, contestation over these norms persists and widely 
accepted frameworks, such as POC, may provide a more adequate logic for action for certain actors 
involved. &KLQD¶V (as ZHOODVRWKHUVWDWHV¶ unwillingness to use the R2P language in justifying its 
vote on Resolution 1973 (2011), generally regarded in R2P terms, exemplifies this tension.  
 
Second, there exist grey areas in intervention to protect civilians that produce inconsistencies in the 
protection patterns, with an emphasis on distinctive groups to be protected, and the policies of such 
vocal proponents of sovereignty and non-interference as China. PNA is one such area, prioritising 
the protection of foreign nationals in crisis situations and posing dilemmas of intervention for states 
whose nationals reside in volatile countries. &KLQD¶Vµ*UHDW(YDFXDWLRQ¶LQ/LE\DKLJKOLJKWVWKHVH
GLOHPPDVUDLVLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW&KLQD¶VWUDGLWLRQDOSRVLWLRQRQQRQ-intervention may require 
adjustments. As Duchâtel et al (2014, 40) argueµ>S@URYLGLQJSURWHFWLRQWRLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHUVRI
nationals overseas could potentially shift Chinese foreign policy away from non-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶,W
remains to be seen how extensive this shift may be as Chinese nationals abroad find themselves in 
the midst of conflict in the future. 
 
Finally, &KLQD¶VDFWLRQVWRSURWHFWWKH&KLQHVHSRSXODWLRQLQ/LE\DVKRZVWKDWLILWFRPHVWRVWDWHV¶ 
nationals facing serious threats abroadVWDWHV¶ commitments to other international principles and 
norms may be compromised, as the aspect of domestic politics becomes more salient. This does not 
mean, however, that state action guided by domestic interests is devoid of normative basis. Driven 
by expanding international economic presence and domestic political pressure, &KLQD¶V evacuation 
adhered to the long-standing notion of responsibility of the Chinese government for the protection 
of its people, both at home and, more recently, abroad. This case calls for a closer consideration of 
domestic norms in the discussion of intervention for civilian protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 See also A/C.6/62/SR.10 of 19 October 2007. )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRI&KLQD¶VH[FHSWLRQVWRWKHUXOHRIVRYHUHLJQW\DQG
non-interference, see Mariani (2011). 
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